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Abstract. Individuals are widely believed to overstate their economic valuation of a good by a
factor of two or three. This paper reports the results of a meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in
28 stated preference valuation studies that report monetary willingness-to-pay and used the
same mechanism for eliciting both hypothetical and actual values. The papers generated 83
observations with a median ratio of hypothetical to actual value of only 1.35, and the distribution has severe positive skewness. We ﬁnd that a choice-based elicitation mechanism is
important in reducing bias. We provide some evidence that the use of student subjects may be
a source of bias, but since this variable is highly correlated with group experimental settings,
ﬁrm conclusions cannot be drawn. There is some weak evidence that bias increases when
public goods are being valued, and that some calibration methods may be eﬀective at reducing
bias. However, results are quite sensitive to model speciﬁcation, which will remain a problem
until a comprehensive theory of hypothetical bias is developed.
Key words: contingent valuation, experiments, hypothetical bias, meta-analysis, stated
preference
JEL classiﬁcations: C9, H41, Q26, Q28

1. Introduction
Stated preference (SP) survey techniques, such as the contingent valuation
method (CVM), typically ask participants questions about their value for
some non-market good. The hypothetical nature of these surveys – in both
the payment for and provision of the good in question – can result in responses that are signiﬁcantly greater than actual payments. This diﬀerence
between stated and revealed values is often referred to as hypothetical bias.1
Despite an abundance of studies, there is no consensus about the underlying
causes of hypothetical bias or ways to calibrate survey responses for it.
At this juncture, two basic questions about hypothetical bias in SP valuation have become paramount. First, what is the magnitude of hypothetical

bias associated with the SP valuation approach? Second, what factors are
responsible for this bias? This paper uses a meta-analysis to reassess the
magnitude of bias present in SP studies. We also attempt to evaluate the
eﬀect of several SP formats and other factors on the degree of hypothetical
bias. However, as noted by Carson et al. (1996), due to the lack of theory
about the causes of hypothetical bias, missing data, and the need to use a
large set of dummy variables, our ability to determine the factors responsible
for hypothetical bias is somewhat limited.
Bohm’s seminal paper comparing hypothetical and actual values was
published in 1972, but it was not until nearly a decade later that this literature
began to grow. In the 1980s, much of the experimental hypothetical bias
literature tested the overall validity of contingent valuation (Harrison and
Rutström, forthcoming). In a series of papers, Bishop and Heberlein found
that hypothetical values for hunting permits consistently exceeded actual
values (Bishop and Heberlein 1979, 1986; Heberlein and Bishop 1986).2 On
the other hand, Dickie et al. (1987) found that values for pints of strawberries
elicited in a hypothetical survey were consistent with those observed when
individuals were given an opportunity to actually purchase the good.3 Subsequent research consistently suggested that values derived from surveys
typically exceed actual values (e.g., Cummings et al. 1995; Fox et al. 1998;
List and Shogren 1998), sometimes by a substantial margin (e.g., Neill et al.
1994). There are exceptions to the conclusion about the existence of hypothetical bias (e.g., Johannesson 1997; Sinden 1988; Smith and Mansﬁeld
1998), but these studies appear to be in the minority: in a recent survey of the
literature, Harrison and Rutström (forthcoming) found a positive bias in 34
of 39 observations. The mean bias in these 39 observations was about 300%,
however this comes from a skewed distribution with a median closer to 67%.
In the last few years, there have been several attempts to synthesize the
plethora of hypothetical bias studies in an attempt to ﬁnd some common
denominators. Foster et al. (1997) present a simple table summarizing 13
studies that highlights two main points: (1) although the primary purpose of
contingent valuation is to value public goods, most of the studies focus on
private goods, and (2) there are signiﬁcant methodological diﬀerences between the studies, such as the type of comparison or the elicitation mechanism. Harrison and Rutström (forthcoming) present a review of the literature
which clearly demonstrates that ‘‘the weight of the evidence supports the
claim that hypothetical valuations exceed real valuations’’. However, they do
not attempt to identify factors that might be associated with hypothetical
bias, instead noting that they are unable to draw any broad conclusions. List
and Gallet (2001) update Foster et al.’s table and then use a meta-analysis to
explore whether there are any systematic relationships between these methodological diﬀerences and hypothetical bias.4 Their results indicate that the
magnitude of hypothetical bias was statistically less for (a) willingness-to-pay

(WTP) as compared to willingness-to-accept (WTA) applications, (b) private
as compared to public goods, and (c) one elicitation method, the ﬁrst price
sealed bid, as compared to the Vickery second-price auction baseline.
The Carson et al. (1996) comparison of revealed and stated preference
studies indicates a strong correlation (0.89) between hypothetical and market
behavior, but since revealed preference measures, like estimates derived from
travel cost studies and hedonic pricing, contain substantial unexplained
variation, Carson et al. test SP convergent validity. Both List and Gallet
(2001) and Harrison and Rutström (forthcoming) test SP criterion validity
because a ‘‘true’’ measure of value is obtained from actual payments for the
good being valued.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our data
and Section 3 describes the model and estimation results. Section 4 concludes
with a summary of our ﬁndings. Our results diﬀer from previous work in two
important respects. First, we ﬁnd that hypothetical bias in SP studies may not
be as important as most previous studies suggest. Second, we question the
prevailing wisdom about several of the factors responsible for this bias.

2. Description of Data
Meta-analysis can be very sensitive to outliers and a lack of variability in
the data. For example, List and Gallet’s (2001, hereafter LG) meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in stated values includes dummy variables for
whether the study used a WTA or a WTP format, the type of experiment
(lab or ﬁeld), type of good (public or private), type of comparison (within
or between subjects), and eight diﬀerent elicitation mechanisms. Most of
the elicitation mechanisms have just one study using that format, and
there are only eight WTA observations. Moreover, two of these WTA
observations are from a single study (Brookshire and Coursey 1987) with
calibration factors that are at least 17 times greater than the mean of the
others. Given the paucity of WTA observations, it is possible that the
signiﬁcance of the WTP coeﬃcient is entirely due to this study and has
nothing to do with a fundamental diﬀerence between responses to WTP
and WTA questions. More importantly, Brookshire and Coursey (1987)
use diﬀerent mechanisms to elicit actual and hypothetical values (Smith
auction and open-ended, respectively). It is possible that their calibration
factors confound hypothetical bias with free-rider bias due to changing
from a demand-revealing mechanism to one that is not.
After updating the LG data for coding diﬀerences (see endnote 4) and
testing for the sensitivity of their results to particular observations, two of
LG’s main conclusions change: (1) the statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between WTP and WTA in the original LG results is sensitive to two extreme

values that use diﬀerent elicitation mechanisms for actual and hypothetical
valuation, and (2) a few elicitation mechanisms remain signiﬁcant, but most
of these variables are based on just a single study and, therefore, should be
interpreted with caution. Their result that hypothetical bias is lower for
private goods is robust throughout the sensitivity analysis.
In an attempt to avoid these and related data problems, we used the
following criteria for determining whether to include an observation in our
dataset:
 We only included WTP observations because, although it is possible that
there are important diﬀerences between WTP and WTA responses,
unfortunately there are not enough WTA studies to truly capture any such
eﬀects. With only a small number of studies, a dummy variable might
simply reﬂect the inﬂuence of a study, rather than that of WTA, on
hypothetical bias. This requirement removed ﬁve studies from the sample.
 The hypothetical and actual values had to be elicited using the same
mechanism. We imposed this requirement to avoid confounding any aﬀects
from the diﬀerent elicitation mechanisms with hypothetical bias. For nine
studies, all the observations reported used diﬀerent elicitation mechanisms
so there are no observations from those papers in our sample.
 The hypothetical and actual values had to be WTP measured in currency,
not, for example, as a percent of people responding ‘‘yes’’ to a dichotomous choice question. All non-US currencies were converted to nominal
US dollars. Since our regression models use hypothetical and actual values
as variables, this requirement keeps the units consistent. We included
dichotomous choice studies if the authors provided an estimate of WTP.
However, since many of these studies do not report monetary estimates of
WTP, this group of studies may be under-represented in our sample. We
were able to locate 13 such studies that provided hypothetical and actual
percent ‘‘yes’’ responses, but were excluded because no cash-based WTP
estimates were provided.5
We were able to identify 59 studies that reported both hypothetical and
actual values (there were an additional four studies that reported ratios of
hypothetical and actual values, but not the respective values). After imposing
these restrictions, our data set includes 28 studies yielding 83 observations.
The hypothetical values range between 0.08 and 301; the mean is 26.55,
median 7.18, and standard deviation 47.33. The actual values range between
0.07 and 95.5; the mean is 11.69, median 3.67, and standard deviation 18.05.
We assume that actual cash-based estimates are unbiased measures of the
true WTP. Consistent with LG and Harrison and Rutström (forthcoming),
the mean CF in our data is 2.60. However, as in the other datasets, this may
be misleading as it comes from a highly skewed distribution with a 1.35
median CF. Figure 1 presents the distribution of CFs.
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Figure 1. Distribution of calibration factors.
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For our econometric analysis of hypothetical bias we deﬁned the independent variables as follows. The variables Private (=1 for private goods,
=0 for public goods), and Within (=1 for within group comparison, =0 for
between group comparison) are deﬁned the same as in LG. We chose not to
use the LG variable Lab because of challenges with precisely deﬁning a
laboratory experiment. Clearly, the typical experiment run on a college
campus using the student body in either a classroom or computer lab would
be coded as Lab. But what about a study such as Cummings et al. (1995) in
which members of a church group were asked about their WTP for an electric
juicer? Procedurally, these experiments were similar to the ‘‘typical’’ oncampus lab experiment, the diﬀerences were in the location (church versus
campus) and the subject pool (students versus adults). We created two new
dummy variables, Student and Group, that are intended to capture essentially
the same eﬀects as LG’s Lab variable. We coded an observation as Student ¼ 1 if the subject pool was college students; Student ¼ 0 if the subject
pool was adults or adult students. Group ¼ 1 if values were elicited in a
group setting such as a classroom, computer lab or church hall; Group ¼ 0 if
values were elicited in an individual setting such as a phone or mail survey.
We should note that the Group variable refers to the setting, not the nature of
the decision. If an individual completed a survey in the classroom, then
Group ¼ 1, and if there was group interaction, e.g., through a Vickrey
auction, but values were elicited individually (such as the baseball card
auctions in List 2003) then Group ¼ 0. There is a high degree of correlation
between the Student and Group variables (Pearson correlation coeﬃcient
equals 0.77), therefore we do not use both variables in the same model.
LG included dummy variables for each of the elicitation mechanisms in
their sample. However, there is not much variability in the elicitation
mechanisms used. In our data, the Vickrey auction accounts for 19% of the
observations, dichotomous choice 25% and open-ended 35%. The other

elicitation mechanisms are typically represented by one or two papers and
provide between one and four observations. Moreover, some elicitation
mechanisms are typically associated with a particular type of good, e.g., a
referendum is normally associated with a public good, and a Vickrey auction
is usually for private goods. This correlation makes it diﬃcult to isolate the
eﬀects of the elicitation mechanism from the type of good. Because of this, we
refrain from using dummy variables for each mechanism. Instead, we create a
new dummy variable that aggregates the elicitation mechanisms into two
groups. The dummy variable Choice equals one for studies that use a choicebased elicitation mechanism (dichotomous and polychotomous choice, referendum, payment card and conjoint).
Some studies report simple descriptive statistics such as mean WTP (e.g.,
Bohm 1972). However, there has been a recent growth in the number of
studies that utilize calibration techniques to control for hypothetical bias.
Studies that employ ex ante, or instrument calibration, techniques, such as
budget reminders (Loomis et al. 1996) or cheap talk scripts (Cummings and
Taylor 1999; List 2001), attempt to get unbiased responses from participants.
Ex post, or statistical calibration techniques, on the other hand, recognize
that responses are biased and attempt to control for it using lab experiments
to calibrate ﬁeld data (Fox et al. 1998) or uncertainty adjustments (Champ
et al. 1997; Poe et al. 2002). The variable Calibrate equals one if the observation is based on any type of calibration technique.

3. Estimation Procedures and Results
There is no theory explaining hypothetical bias that could provide guidance
as to the appropriate model speciﬁcation. Therefore, we limit our choice of
variables to research protocol and study characteristics for which data were
readily available. We begin with a simple double log regression model (Model
1a) that explains actual value as a function of the hypothetical value
lnActValue ¼ b0 þ b1  lnHypValue þ b2  ðlnHypValueÞ2 þe;

ð1Þ

where lnActValue and lnHypValue denote the natural log of the actual and
hypothetical values.6, 7
Because White’s test indicates the presence of heteroskadasticity
(P-value ¼ 0.0002), Table I reports the results from a weighted regression,
using the square root of lnHypValue to transform the data.8 This simple
speciﬁcation ﬁts the data quite well, with an adjusted R2 of 0.83. All the
coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The results indicate
that the bias increases as the hypothetical value increases. When evaluated at
the mean hypothetical value (26.55), the predicted actual value is 10.24 which
yields a calibration factor of 2.59. When the model is evaluated at the median
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hypothetical value (7.18), we get a predicted actual value of 3.89 and a 1.84
calibration factor. Interestingly, these estimates are roughly consistent with
NOAA’s calibration factor of two.
To determine whether there are some factors that may help explain the
cause of this bias, we estimated the following model (Model 2a):
lnActValue ¼ b0 þ b1  lnHypValue þ b2  ðlnHypValueÞ2 þb3  Student
þ b4  Private þ b5  Within þ b6  Choice
þ b7  Calibrate þ e:

ð2Þ

The results for Model 2a are in Table I. When all independent variables are
evaluated at their means, the resulting predicted actual value is 8.83 and the
CF is 3.01. Evaluating the model at the median of the independent variables
yields a CF of 2.47.
Variables with positive coeﬃcients are associated with larger actual values
and, therefore, lower hypothetical bias; negative coeﬃcients have the opposite interpretation. The intercept and the coeﬃcient on the quadratic term for
lnHypValue continue to be positive and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient for
Within is also positive and signiﬁcant; this would be consistent with the
possibility that in a within-group study, participants might try to maintain
some consistency between their hypothetical and actual values. Private was
signiﬁcant in LG’s results, but not in our Model 2a. Calibration techniques
appear to be eﬀective at reducing hypothetical bias.
The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for Choice indicates that the
choice-based elicitation mechanisms are associated with less hypothetical
bias. There may be several reasons for this ﬁnding. First, substitutes are made
explicit in the choice format and this may encourage respondents to explore
their preferences and tradeoﬀs in more detail. Neoclassical theory indicates
that if few substitutes are considered, respondents will likely express a higher
WTP than if many are considered, all else equal. From a psychological
perspective, the process of making choices is quite diﬀerent from that of
pricing, as in open ended CV (Brown 1984; Irwin et al. 1993; McKenzie
1993). Another factor is that some choice formats, like conjoint, allow
respondents to directly express ambivalence, indiﬀerence or uncertainty.
Since a high level of uncertainty is often associated with signiﬁcant hypothetical bias, choice formats may produce less bias (Champ et al. 1997).
The negative coeﬃcient on Student suggests that there may also be a
subject pool eﬀect. However, since all the studies in our sample that use
students are laboratory experiments, it is unclear whether the cause of
hypothetical bias is the subject pool or the setting. We replaced the Student
variable in Equation (2) with a Group dummy variable that equals one if
values were elicited in a group setting such as a lab experiment. The results of
this regression are in Table I, Model 2b. The coeﬃcient for Group is negative

and signiﬁcant, therefore, although there is clearly an eﬀect, we cannot distinguish whether the cause is the subject pool or the setting.
In Model 2b, Calibrate is no longer signiﬁcant, and Private is now signiﬁcant at the 5% level, possibly suggesting some sensitivity to model speciﬁcation. In the absence of a theory that explains the relationship between
hypothetical and actual values, we hesitate to place much emphasis on the
signiﬁcance of particular dummy variables. Moreover, there may simply not
be suﬃcient variability in the data to capture some of these eﬀects. Instead,
we note that most of the variation is explained by the simple Model 1a and
make the primary conclusion that hypothetical bias increases with larger
hypothetical values. For smaller hypothetical values that are common in CV
studies, our results suggest that hypothetical bias may not be a major
problem. For example, the predicted CF from a $10 hypothetical value is
essentially one, a $21.50 hypothetical value produces a 1.50 CF, and a CF of
2 results from a $32.50 hypothetical value. The Group/Student and the
Choice dummy variables are consistently signiﬁcant and are therefore likely
to have some impact on hypothetical bias. We also tested the sensitivity
of our results to extreme values by dropping the ﬁve largest CFs and reestimating Equation (2). The results of this trimmed model (Model 3), provided in Table I, are generally consistent with those of Model 2.
There are a few studies that provide a relatively large number of observations. To control for the possibility that our results could be unduly
inﬂuenced by such studies, we calculated the mean hypothetical and actual
values from each study for a given set of independent variables. With this
approach, it is still possible for a study to provide more than one observation.
In the case of Sinden (1988), for example, 17 observations were reduced to
two: the mean of the 16 observations that use students, and the single
observation that uses adults. The resulting data set has 45 observations. The
mean CF is 3.26 and the median is 1.50. Regression results are available on
the authors’ web site. Consistent with the results in Table I (which uses the
full data set), the hypothetical value seems to be the best predictor of actual
value (for every regression, an F-test of the null hypothesis that b1 ¼ b2 ¼ 0
in Equations (1) and (2) is rejected at the 1% level of signiﬁcance).
Because conclusions about the signiﬁcance of most of the dummy variables is rather sensitive, another way to gauge whether a variable has an eﬀect
on hypothetical bias is to ask whether the CF changes as the variable changes
within a particular study. Some studies report multiple observations because
they are testing the eﬀects of a particular variable. For example, nine of the
ten studies that use a calibration technique report observations for which
Calibrate=1 and Calibrate=0.9 The authors then compare the hypothetical
bias with and without calibration to test its eﬀectiveness. In each of these nine
studies, the mean CF using a calibration technique is less than the mean CF
for the uncalibrated observations, suggesting that calibration techniques are

eﬀective at reducing hypothetical bias. When the observations from these
nine studies are combined, the mean CF for the 15 observations that do not
use a calibration is 5.42 with a standard deviation of 6.32, and the median is
2.66. There were another 15 observations that used a calibration technique;
the mean was 1.59, standard deviation 1.02 and median 1.18. As one might
expect, the mean and median CF are lower for those observations that use a
calibration technique. A Wilcoxon rank sum test conﬁrms that this diﬀerence
is highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level.

4. Conclusions
This paper presents a meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in WTP contingent
valuation studies. We ﬁnd that the primary factor that explains this bias is the
magnitude of the hypothetical value. Attempts to identify other factors that
may be associated with hypothetical bias yielded mixed results. In all the
models estimated, the coeﬃcients for the Group/Student and Choice dummy
variables were consistently signiﬁcant and of relatively large magnitude. In
addition, a comparison of calibration factors within particular studies indicates that calibration techniques are eﬀective at reducing hypothetical bias.
We also ﬁnd that LG’s conclusion that hypothetical bias is greater in WTA
studies is based on only eight observations and is driven by a pair of extreme
values from a single study that use diﬀerent elicitation mechanisms for
hypothetical and actual values. We exclude WTA studies from our data
because there are insuﬃcient studies to incorporate this variable in a metaanalysis.
We are reluctant to over-emphasize the signiﬁcance of the dummy variables because a meta-analysis of hypothetical bias appears to be very sensitive to model speciﬁcation, a lack of variability in the data, and treatment of
extreme values. In addition, some of our key ﬁndings diﬀer from those
reported in previous research. For example, a consistent result in LG was
that private goods had a lower and statistically signiﬁcant CF than public
goods, but our results on this conclusion are mixed, depending upon model
speciﬁcation. One variable that we found to consistently be statistically signiﬁcant (Student/Group) was not signiﬁcant in LG (their Lab variable).
We believe that this is a consequence of several factors. First, half of the
calibration factors are between 0.85 and 1.50, and 70% of the calibration
factors are below 2. However, as shown in Figure 1, the sample has severe
positive skewness. The mean CF for the top 10 observations is 10.3, compared with 1.54 for the other 73 observations. This suggests that econometric
estimates of hypothetical bias can often be driven by a few observations.
Second, the need to use large sets of dummy variables and the multicollinearity associated with them can make it diﬃcult to isolate the impact of

factors that might be responsible for hypothetical bias. For example, provision point mechanisms and Smith auctions are only associated with public
goods, and Vickrey auctions only with private goods. And, since a comprehensive theory of hypothetical bias has not been developed, model speciﬁcation is generally based on intuition. As a result, the sensitivity of
hypothetical bias meta-analyses should not be surprising. This means that
our ability to determine the factors responsible for this bias is quite limited,
and that estimates of statistical signiﬁcance associated with several potentially important determinants of bias should be viewed with caution. However, the evidence is quite strong that there is a positive quadratic relationship
between hypothetical values and hypothetical bias, and the results of our
Model 1 may provide some insights into the potential magnitude of this bias.
Finally, we note that discussions that focus solely on the mean calibration
factor could be misleading because of the large disparity between the mean
and median calibration factors. As shown in Figure 1, the overwhelming
majority of observations have relatively low CFs, possibly suggesting that
hypothetical bias may not be as signiﬁcant a problem in stated preference
analyses as is often thought. On the other hand, a small but non-trivial
number of observations have rather large CFs. We were unable to identify
any systematic patterns in these observations. Although our trimmed model
excludes the largest CFs, it would be premature to simply dismiss these
observations as outliers. Rather, it is important to develop a better understanding of the conditions under which these large CFs arise.
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Notes
1. The terms revealed, real and actual values are used interchangeably and refer to situations in
which an individual makes a consequential economic commitment – in experimental studies,
this typically involves payment for a good by the participant. Most studies of hypothetical
bias assume that these cash-based estimates are unbiased. On the other hand, stated or
hypothetical values refer to survey responses that lack any salient economic commitment.
2. Hanemann (1984) highlights the sensitivity of this conclusion.

3. Harrison and Rutström (forthcoming) argue that a more detailed examination their data
yields mixed results, and that, on average, hypothetical values exceed actual values by 58%.
4. Because there are a few typos and coding errors in the List and Gallet table, and because
variations of this table appear in four separate journal articles, the authors’ web site contains a brief comment that identiﬁes and corrects these. The URL is http://www.umass.edu/
resec/faculty/murphy/meta/meta.html. This web site also contains the data and some supplemental tables.
5. The data in Harrison and Rutström (forthcoming) include both dollar-based estimates and
values derived from yes–no studies. We refrain from combining these two types of responses
because calibration factors derived from each type of response have diﬀerent interpretations.
6. The quadratic term in this equation allows for the possibility that there is a non-linear
relationship. A simple linear relationship is a special case in which b2 ¼ 0:
7. LG use the natural log of calibration factor as the dependent variable in their model. It
is straightforward to show that our Equation (1) can also be speciﬁed using
the log of the inverse of the calibration factor as the dependent variable:
lnðCF1 Þ ¼ b0 þ b01  lnHypValue þ b2  lnHypValue2 þ e where b01 ¼ b1  1. LG note that
they also estimated a model using ln(CF )1) and found that this did not aﬀect their conclusions.
8. This transformation required that six of the 83 observations be dropped due to negative
lnHypValue.
9. We only did this simple comparison for Calibrate because none of the other dummy
variables had a suﬃcient number of studies to conduct a within-study analysis of its eﬀects.
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